Third parties are thought to face a tradeoff in that those actions most likely to bring peace in the short run appear least likely to ensure its long run stability. Yet the tradeoff between conflict management and conflict resolution may be overstated. Analyzing an iterated three player bargaining model with both information and commitment problems, we first demonstrate two conditions under which third parties may produce lasting peace through conditional subsidies, even without addressing underlying informational or commitment problems. Second, we illustrate this possibility by analyzing the impact of US foreign aid on patterns of conflict and peace between Israel and her neighbors. Our analysis indicates that the termination of the rivalry between Israel and Egypt was most likely not brought about by the Camp David accords or peacekeeping operations, but by sustained foreign aid provision. We discuss the implications for both this conflict and conflict management more broadly. * We thank Andrew Boutton, Bill Reed, Ben Horne, W. Kindred Winecoff, and Scott Wolford for helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are our own.
Can third parties bring lasting peace?
Recent work suggests a depressing answer, telling us that the conditions under which conflict resolution can be achieved are limited, while mere conflict management only delays the inevitable (Beardsley 2008 , 2011 , Werner and Yuen 2005 . In contrast, we argue that third parties can sometimes bring lasting peace even without addressing the underlying information and commitment problems that might otherwise lead to war. Under certain conditions, genuine conflict resolution is not necessary to prevent war indefinitely.
To develop our argument, we analyze a bargaining model that allows for both information and commitment problems. We first discuss an equilibrium that illustrates extant claims about the counterproductive nature of conflict management. We then discuss two equilibria in which third parties can produce lasting peace. When the primary obstacle to negotiation is a commitment problem induced by a rapid shift in power, subsidies in the short term bring lasting peace. When the primary obstacle stems from information problems, sustained third party commitments can bring peace in both the short and long term.
We then illustrate the plausibility and applicability of these results with a quantitative case study of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We demonstrate that, from 1948 to 2001, conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbors occurred more frequently in the presence of conditions that exacerbate information and commitment problems, but only when the US did not provide foreign aid. Moreover, since 1973, the US has provided more economic aid to Israel and Egypt when observable indicators suggested that armed conflict would otherwise be particularly likely. Taken together, these results indicate that the primary reason Israel and Egypt have been at peace for forty years is external subsidies.
Recent events, we think, lend credence to this view. While briefly in power, the Muslim Brotherhood's political arm threatened to "revisit" the 1979 treaty with Israel if the US were to cut off aid, (New York Times, 3/16/2012) . According to the New York Times, "Egyptians have long considered American aid as a kind of payment for preserving the peace despite the popular resentment of Israel."
After discussing the Arab-Israeli conflict, we briefly consider other cases where third parties have either fostered or reinforced peace through the selective provision of tangible economic benefits. We focus specifically on Greek and Turkish trade with the US following the Turco-Cypriot War, the EU's insistence on normalized relations between Serbia and Kosovo as a condition for Serbian accession, and the role of democracy aid in preventing civil conflict in democratizing states.
We conclude by discussing the implications of our work for the study and practice of conflict management.
Managing and Resolving Conflicts
A consensus has recently emerged around three findings in the study of third party influence on the stability of postwar peace.
1 First, the recurrence of war is less likely when the belligerents are allowed to "fight it out" than when they are interrupted by third parties.
2 Second,consent-based peacekeeping discourages the recurrence of conflict. 3 Finally, the prospects for genuine conflict resolution are bleak. While some have articulated conditions under which mediation resolves information problems that might otherwise give rise to conflict, 4 a critical assumption of such arguments is that third parties possess information the belligerents have already been assumed to have an incentive to keep private; 5 without such an assumption, there is little reason to expect mediation as information revelation to resolve conflicts, and no systematic evidence that it does so (Fey and Ramsay 2010) .
1 In contrast, there is little consensus regarding the effect of third party intervention in an ongoing war. See, inter alia, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008), Regan and Aydin (2006) , Regan (2002) .
2 See especially Werner and Yuen (2005) and Beardsley (2008 Beardsley ( , 2011 . On the value of decisive outcomes, see also Senese and Quackenbush (2003) and Quackenbush and Venteicher (2008) .
3 See Doyle and Sambanis (2000) , Fortna (2004) , and Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) . However, see also Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter (2008) .
4 See especially Kydd (2003) . 5 Note that Smith and Stam (2003) similarly conclude there is little prospect for mediation to reveal information in practice. They argue that the theoretical possibility of information revelation via mediation exists, but in practice mediators are often too biased for their efforts to be credible. Of course, Kydd (2003) argues that it precisely because of their bias that mediators are sometimes able to credibly convey information. But Kydd has little to say about how mediators come to posses such information.
In short, recent work indicates that third parties are unable to produce genuine conflict resolution for the very reasons that states find it difficult to reach negotiated settlements on their own. This suggests that mere conflict management, which is thought to only bring peace in the short term, is the only option open to would-be peacemakers.
The bargaining literature tells us that wars are likely to end only once a convergence of expectations about each side's capabilities and/or resolve has been reached, unless of course one side is defeated outright.
6 Once this convergence occurs, neither side can reasonably expect to profit from continuing to fight, and peace becomes self-enforcing. Thus, Werner and Yuen (2005) and Beardsley (2008 Beardsley ( , 2011 argue that when third parties press for peace before belief convergence, they sow the seeds of future conflict. Since the third party's interest will inevitably wane, such intervention does little more than kick the can down the road.
We add an important caveat: while the third party's attention might often wane, we need not assume that it always does-and if the third party is willing to provide subsidies in perpetuity, then war may forever loom beyond the horizon. This is important because the exceptions-such as the extended commitment on behalf of the United States to maintaining peace between Egypt and Israel, or managing relations between Greece and Turkey-concern conflicts of great interest to the international system.
Further, we demonstrate below that one-time transfers are sufficient when third parties seek to prevent conflicts arising from commitment problems induced by rapid shifts in power.
The intuition here, simply enough, is that future shifts in power create temporary problems.
Thus, temporary fixes are sufficient. 7 An unappreciated implication of the logic linking rapid shifts in power to war is that once the shift occurs, the problem goes away. 8 It is not the shift itself that causes war, but the anticipation thereof, and the incentive this creates for preventive war. Third parties thus need only raise the cost of war to until the shift transpires.
We turn now to the formal model we use to develop the logic of our argument.
6 See especially Wagner (2000) , Powell (2004a) and Slantchev (2003b) . Slantchev and Leventoglu (2007) and Powell (2012) demonstrate that limited wars can also resolve commitment problems. 7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 8 However, see Reed, Wolford, and Arena (N.d.) .
The Model
Two actors, A and B, dispute the division of a good or bundle of goods whose value is normalized to 1. 9 Some third party, C, is primarily interested in ensuring a peaceful outcome.
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Each period t ∈ [1, ∞) begins with C proposing some bundle of subsidies, consisting of σ At ∈ [0, ∞) and σ Bt ∈ [0, ∞), where σ At is the amount to be allocated to A in the event that an agreement is reached, and σ Bt is the amount that will be allocated to B. For ease of exposition, let σ t = σ At + σ Bt denote the total subsidies that C offers.
Though C announces the size of σ At and σ Bt at the start of the period, and thus A and B are aware of what they stand to lose if they fight, C only delivers σ t if war is averted.
After observing C's choice of σ tA and σ tB , A decides whether to attack B immediately or enter negotiations, 11 which we model using the ultimatum bargaining protocol. That is,
A proposes some division of the good, such that x t ∈ [0, 1] is allocated to A and 1 − x t to B in the event of an agreement. Should B accept this proposal, it is implemented, and A and B's flow payoffs reflect their shares of the good as well as σ tA and σ tB .
We abstract away from the very real possibility that belligerents fail to uphold their agreements in order to focus on situations where obstacles to peace exist despite common knowledge that enforceable agreements are available.
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If B rejects A's proposal, a battle occurs. This may represent either the onset or continuation of war, depending upon the decisions made in t − 1. Regardless of whether an agreement is struck or a battle fought, play then proceeds to period t + 1. Neither peace nor war is treated as a terminal outcome here, the way one or the other is in most models.
13
9 Note that we need not assume that A and B represent internationally recognized sovereign states, though negotiations between governments a non-state actors may differ from those between states in ways we do not explore here.
10 We'll generally assume the third party is a state, but we could easily envision C as an international governmental organization (IGO) or non-governmental organization (NGO) instead.
11 Naturally, there is no reason that B could not also attack immediately. But since we will assume that the passage of time strictly advantages B, it is only A that would ever have a clear incentive to do so.
12 This assumption is standard in the literature. However, see Schultz (2010) , who demonstrates that when actors have incentives to defect from agreements, and cannot monitor compliance, war may be unavoidable.
13 See, inter alia, Filson and Werner (2002) , Powell (2004b) , Slantchev (2003a,b) , Slantchev and Leventoglu (2007) , Smith and Stam (2004) and Wagner (2000) for examples of models where negotiations end the We allow for both informational and commitment problems. Specifically, we assume that if A attacks in t, A wins the resulting battle with probability p tI = m tA m tA + m tB , whereas A wins battles that occur after failed attempts at negotiation with probability
, where α t > 0 ensures that p tI > p tN . Let m ti > 0 denote the material capabilities of i ∈ {A, B} in period t, and let α t denote the advantage accruing to B if A does not attack immediately. Further, let the value of m tA and α t be common knowledge while only B knows the value of m tB . We assume that A and C only know that m tB = m tB with probability ω and m tB = m tB with probability 1 − ω, where m tB < m tB . Thus, A and C both know the probability with which B will be relatively weak or relatively strong, and also know that, regardless of B's initial capabilities, B will be more difficult to defeat if A does not attack immediately.
14 We also assume p tI > p t+1I and p tN > p t+1B , which ensures that A will not attack immediately in t > t if A does not do so in t.
Should a battle take place, both A and B suffer a loss of utility due to the costs of war, denoted c ∈ (0, 1]. Without loss of generality, we do not allow c to vary by i (i.e., by actor), t (i.e., period), or the circumstances under which fighting occurred (pre-or post-negotiations).
We model battles as partially decisive. Let q t ∈ (0, 1) denote the share of the good in dispute possessed by A at the start of period t, with 1 − q t held by B, where q t reflects some initial value, q 0 , as well as all previous battle outcomes. Should A prevail in period t, A's share of the good becomes q t ≡ q t + β t 1 + β t , where β t ∈ (0, 1) indexes the stakes of the battle fought in period t. 15 Should B prevail in period t, then A's share of the good shifts to q t ≡ q t 1 + β t . Since q t > q t > q t , A's share of the good in dispute strictly increases after battlefield victories and decreases after defeats.
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game. See Fearon (1995) , Fey and Ramsay (2010) , Powell (1996 Powell ( , 2006 and Tarar and Leventoglu (2008) for examples of models where war ends the game. However, see Powell (2012) for an example of a model that, like ours, allows the game to continue in either case. 14 While the actual capabilities each side possesses may change over time, we assume that B's type is fixed. That is, while m tB need not equal m t+xB , if m tB = m tB , then m t+xB will equal m t+xB .
15 Note, q t becomes q t+1 , provided a battle occurs in t and A is victorious.
16 Naturally, B controls however much of the good is not possessed by A. For example, if a battle occurs in period t and A prevails, then B's share of the good in dispute for period t is 1 − q t + β t 1 + β t .
C receives 0 in any period in which fighting occurs and ι t − σ t if A and B reach an agreement, where ι t > 0 reflects the degree of C's interest in seeing a peaceful outcome in period t. In practice, it is unlikely that C truly has no preference whatsoever in the outcome of a war between A and B, but we abstract away from such concerns to focus attention on situations where C's prevailing concern is stability.
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While we allow most of the parameters to vary with t, we do not focus on the implications of changes over time in most of them. One exception is ι t , which we assume is subject to exogenous shocks between periods. This allows us to analyze cases where C's interest wanes, as it is typically assumed to, as well as cases where it is relatively stable.
Baseline Analysis
We begin by establishing a set of baseline expectations when C does not provide subsidies, which largely mirror results that are well-established in the literature. We will refer back to these when discussing our expectations for Arab-Israeli relations absent US intervention.
There are many pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs) to our model. 18 To ease exposition, we focus on a few key results that yield clear empirical implications with respect to the likelihood of conflict and the distribution of material capabilities.
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Proposition 1. War is more likely when the distribution of capabilities is shifting rapidly.
Proposition 2. War is more likely if the two sides are near parity.
17 Assigning C a payoff of 0 in the event of war also overlooks the possibility that domestic or international audiences might punish C for failing to do everything in their power to prevent conflict. While we believe such dynamics might well be at work in some real world situations, perhaps including US management of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we leave this possibility for future analysis.
18 MPEs require actors to play Markov strategies, or those that maximize their expected utilities as of period t, treating each period as a distinct sub-game. The actors thus do not condition on the history of play, except insofar as this history pertains to their per-period payoffs.
19 Our model provides novel implications about the technology of war that we do not explore here. For example, as β t decreases, we see increases in the threshold that determines whether A attacks B immediately and as well as the threshold that determines whether A selects a value of x t that risks war if A chooses to attempt negotiations at all. This suggests that peace is more stable when a single battlefield victory will produce little advantage. Second, our model indicates that war need not be inefficient, provided the implications of victory on the battlefield for future payoffs are large enough. However, we leave fuller exploration of these results for future analysis.
Proposition 3. Rapid shifts that bring the distribution of capabilities closer to parity are more likely to cause war than are shifts away from parity.
Neither of the first two results is particularly novel.
20 However, we believe ours is the first bargaining model to point to both results simultaneously, and to further indicate that the conditions under which A chooses to forgo negotiations, attacking outright, are more readily satisfied when the looming shift in power would bring the two sides closer to parity.
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Should A forgo the opportunity to attack B immediately, there are only two proposals A offers in equilibrium. One, denoted x t , ensures that B will accept regardless of type. The other, x t , allocates a larger share to A but is only accepted if B is relatively weak. A proposes
x if and only if ω >ω tx , or only when sufficiently optimistic such terms will be accepted.
When ω >ω tx , A prefers to attack B immediately provided ω >ω tb . When ω ≤ω tx , A attacks immediately provided ω >ω tm . Using these three thresholds, which are defined in the appendix, we can fully characterize A's strategy.
Delaying the Inevitable
We begin our consideration of the impact of subsidies by returning to the argument made by Werner and Yuen (2005) and Beardsley (2008 Beardsley ( , 2011 . In particular, we consider the possibility that even if attempts to end fighting are successful in the short term, they only delay the inevitable. In fact, we present a slightly stronger version of the argument-our model indicates that third parties can not only sow the seeds of future conflicts by ending wars prematurely, but also when they prevent wars. This suggests that we might find further empirical support for their argument if we look beyond cases where third party intervention ended an ongoing war to cases where subsidies were offered during times of peace.
We are now prepared to state our first key result regarding external subsidies.
20 See, inter alia, Fearon (1995) and Powell (2004b Powell ( , 2006 on rapid shifts in power. On the relationship between parity and uncertainty, see Slantchev (2004) and Reed (2003) .
21 Consult the appendix for formal proofs of these and all propositions. 22 Taken together, these results echo the primary arguments of Power Transition Theory. See, inter alia, Organski (1958) , Organski and Kugler (1980) and Lemke (2002) . Proposition 4. If C's interests are insufficiently stable over time, subsides shift the risk of war due to informational problems from the present into the future.
While a more formal proof can be found in the appendix, the intuition behind this result is straightforward. Supposeω tx < ω ≤ω tb would hold should C set σ t = 0.
23 This would indicate that, if C does not provide any subsidies, A would forgo the opportunity to attack outright, but would risk war with the terms it proposes to B. Thus, if C does not act, there is a chance that war will break out. Under such conditions, there exist equilibria in which C provides sufficiently large subsidies in period t to ensure that A no longer finds it optimal to risk war. By increasing the opportunity cost of war, C reduces A's incentive to respond to uncertainty by risking war in hopes of attaining a better deal.
However, when C does so, this does not address the fundamental source of the problem.
Should an exogenous shock in t + 1 yield ι t+1 < ι t , C may not provide sufficient subsidies to dissuade A from risking war in t + 1. That is, we can readily identify equilibria in which C prevents A from risking war in period t but sets σ = 0 in period t + 1. Since A learns nothing about B's private information in t, the information problem remains at t + 1, and once C's subsidies go away, A will then propose terms that B might reject.
Put differently, C can temporarily mitigate the consequences of A's information problem by subsidizing peaceful outcomes. A's uncertainty over B's military capabilities remains, but A has less incentive to risk war in hopes of getting a better deal when rejection not only means incurring c but forgoing σ A . Yet if C's interest suddenly decreases, prompting C to cease providing subsidies, then A will risk war by setting
This largely confirms the claim that when third parties manipulate material incentives rather than resolving the underlying causes of war, they only delay the inevitable. Whether third parties seek to manipulate the decision of the belligerents by offering subsidies that reward peace, by attempting to raise the costs of fighting (Werner and Yuen 2005) , or some mix thereof, they do nothing to prevent A from risking war once the external force is removed.
23 Which, to be more precise, implies that C has set σ At = σ Bt = 0.
Getting Through Tough Times
Let us now turn to cases where C provides subsidies ahead of a large shift in power but does not do so once the shift has transpired. We focus here on cases where the primary obstacle to negotiated agreements is one of credible commitment.
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The anticipation of a future shift in power can lead to war, but the commitment problem stemming therefrom disappears once the shift occurs. Shifts in power are not themselves destabilizing, at least according to the standard logic of commitment problems. Understanding that helps one to appreciate our next result.
Proposition 5. Temporary subsidies from C may promote peace in both the short and long term, provided the primary obstacle to negotiated agreements is a commitment problem induced by a looming rapid shift in power.
Supposeω tm < ω ≤ω tx would hold provided σ t = 0. This indicates that, absent any influence from C, A would attack B, though were A to attempt negotiations, A would issue a proposal that B would accept regardless of type. Should C select a sufficiently large value of σ t , that will compensate A (either directly, in the form of σ tA , or indirectly, in the form of σ tB , which allows A to demand more from B) for the loss in bargaining power that A is about to suffer. Yet C need not provide any subsidies in t + 1, since the incentive for A attack outright rather than attempt negotiations will be gone by then.
Always a Day Away
Even when the primary obstacle to a negotiated settlement is an information problem that won't fade away when the current period ends, there is room for hope. While we do not dispute that, on average, peace will be less stable following wars that end without the players' beliefs converging, this masks variation that is potentially quite relevant to both scholars and policy makers. That is, if C fails to resolve the underlying problem, but maintains interest in the dispute, war indefinitely hovers just over horizon, without ever actually occurring.
Proposition 6. If C is willing to provide arbitrarily large subsidies in each of an indefinite number of periods, C can indefinitely prevent wars that would otherwise occur without resolving the underlying informational problem.
Suppose thatω tx < ω ≤ω tb would hold if σ t = 0. This indicates that unless C provides sufficiently large subsidies, A will propose terms that B will accept only if relatively weak.
However, provided ι t is sufficiently large, and any exogenous shocks in the future are expected to be relatively small, C offers arbitrarily large subsidies in each of an indefinite number of periods, and peace is ensured in each. 25 C's behavior is causally responsible for the peace that obtains in equilibrium, as the probability of war would be positive if C did not provide subsidies. But A remains uncertain about B's capabilities.
Informally, if C is likely to remain committed to preventing war tomorrow, and the day after that, it doesn't much matter that C only engages in conflict management rather than resolution. Either way, the probability of war will be negligible for the foreseeable future.
Of course, we do not dispute that resolving the underlying cause of the conflict would be preferable to raising the effective costs thereof, if at all possible. As discussed above, however, recent work suggests that it generally is not. We have growing reason to believe that states benefit from actions that create uncertainty (Meirowitz and Sartori 2008) and that there are significant challenges facing third parties who attempt to facilitate the credible revelation of information that the belligerents do not wish to have revealed (Fey and Ramsay 2010) . 26 It therefore may not be fruitful to focus on the credible revelation of private information as a path to peace, even if we believe that the primary cause of war in most cases is the incentive states have to misrepresent their private information.
Subsidized Peace between Israel and Her Neighbors
Taken together, our propositions lead us to expect that subsidies from a third party may do more than simply shift the risk of war into the near future. To illustrate this possibility, we use a quantitative case study of United States' involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Our basic argument is as follows. The Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949 marked the onset of a territorial rivalry between various Arab states and Israel, who captured vast swaths of territory-territory that, under the UN Partition Plan, was to be allocated to the Palestinians. In the subsequent years, several wars occurred, but a fear of Soviet involvement typically led the US to intervene, pressuring the belligerents into ending the conflict prematurely. However, the US did not initially seek to shore up the peace it created by providing conditional subsidies in the form of foreign aid, as it later would. Unsurprisingly, then, each new spell of peace proved no more stable than the last.
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All of that changed in the fall of 1973. The Yom Kippur War sparked a chain of events that collectively constituted an exogenous shock to the level of US interest in maintaining stability in the region and thus a change in strategy. Specifically, while the October war did not directly cause a shortfall in the production of oil, it played an important role in motivating the Arab Oil Embargo that in turn led to the 1973 Oil Crisis that sent the United States into a deep recession that kicked off an unprecedented period of stagflation.
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Thus, the US had a greater incentive to focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict than ever before.
While traditional explanations of the remarkable transformation of Israeli-Egyptian relations in the years that followed emphasize the Camp David accords and/or peacekeeping operations, we argue that the dramatic increase in the provision of US foreign aid to both Israel and Egypt is the best explanation for the absence of war between Israel and Egypt since 1973. While there is every reason to believe that information and commitment problems have remained/returned, as we'll discuss below, the United States' sustained commitment to subsidizing peace continues to discourage conflict to this day.
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That is, we do not argue that the United States managed to resolve the conflict between Israel and Egypt. Rather, we argue that the US realized in 1973 that the price of continued conflict was greater than it had once believed, and so began devoting substantial resources towards managing the conflict. The success of such a strategy over a period of 40 years stands in contrast to the expectations of Werner and Yuen (2005) and Beardsley (2011), but we nonetheless stress that our argument implies the potential for a return to conflict between Israel and Egypt should the US ever cease providing subsidies.
To support this argument, we turn now to analysis both of patterns of conflict between
Israel and her Arab neighbors and variation in the provision of foreign aid by the US. We demonstrate that, in the absence of subsidies from the US in the form of foreign aid, parity and anticipated future shifts in power are associated with an increase in the incidence of the most hostile militarized interstate disputes, as anticipated by Propositions 1, 2 and Corollary 3. Yet as the total amount of economic aid provided by the US increases, this effect shrinks, eventually disappearing altogether, as Propositions 5 and 6 would lead us to expect. Finally, we demonstrate that since the Yom Kippur War, one of the key determinants of the amount of economic aid received by Israel and Egypt in any given year is the presence of observable factors that indicate an elevated risk of conflict. This suggests that aid not only facilitates peace, but is provided, at least in part, because it facilitates peace.
29 In fairness, the United States has many reasons for providing foreign aid to Israel. One might argue that any US threat to withdraw aid to Israel in the event of a war with Egypt might not be credible. It is not clear to us that this is the case, but either way, the relationship between aid to Egypt and peaceful relations with Israel seems quite clear-not only to us, but to the Egyptians as well, as discussed above. The variable ranges from 0 to over 5,500 (i.e., $5.5 billion).
Data and Operationalization
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We measure parity as Parity d,t = 1 − lnCINC Hi,t lnCINC Hi,t + lnCINC Lo,t , where lnCINC Hi,t denotes the log of the higher Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score in year 30 That is, our sample begins with Israel's proclamation of independence and ends in the last year for which the data on militarized interstate disputes are available.
31 Focusing on MIDs that at least involve the use of force, as opposed to including all MIDs, decreases the risk of confirming our expectations about the incidence of violent conflict with actions states undertake in an effort to prevent such an outcome. That is, the two categories below the use of force, threats to use force and shows of force, might well represent attempts to signal resolve (Fearon 1997 , Slantchev 2005 . By excluding threats to use force and displays of force, we narrow the dependent variable from 61 non-zero observations to 52, of which 19 violent MIDs involved Egypt, 8 Jordan, 6 Lebanon and 19 Syria. We do not further restrict our focus to the highest category of disputes, those labeled wars according to an arbitrary fatality threshold, because our game-theoretic model only concerns whether states resort to an inefficient use of violence, irrespective of whether that violence meets a certain criterion of intensity. That is, while we used the term "war" above to refer to outcomes in which the actors did not reach a peaceful agreement, we did so using a broader conceptualization thereof than is embodied in the MID project's coding rules.
32 Data available from the United States Agency for International Development website (US Agency for International Development 2011). The subsidies are measured as total amounts allocated per dyad because the model indicates that subsidies provided to B have the same effect, if for a different reason, as those provided to A. That is, conditional subsidies to A directly increase the effective cost of war for A, discouraging it from either attack or risking war with its choice of terms. Subsidies provided to B allow A to extract greater concessions without provoking resistance, and so also reduce this incentive, albeit indirectly. Note that we did not include provision of military aid, as it is likely that this form of aid is given for different reasons, and, moreover, influences the distribution of military capabilities. In our theoretical model, we assumed that the subsidies provided by C were simply of intrinsic value to A and B. Consideration of third party subsidies that alter capabilities, both theoretically and empirically, lies outside the scope of this paper.
33 Note that the USAID website does not report disbursements under $50,000. The lowest nonzero value in our dataset is .7, or $700,000. The data on the CINC scores come from the Correlates of War data set on National Material Capabilities (version 4.0), updated to cover the years of 1816-2007 from the original publication in Singer, Bremer, and Stucky (1972) . CINC scores record a state's share of the world's total material capabilities, as measured by demographic, military, and industrial factors. 35 We log each side's CINC score because the distribution of CINC scores exhibits a right skew, and we have little reason to believe that a given increase in capabilities has the same effect for states that are already powerful as for those who are relatively weak. 36 The predicted values,ĈINC Hi,t+1 andĈINC Lo,t+1 are generated, separately, by regressing CINC scores for each state in year t on CINC scores in year t − 1 and the military aid provided by the US to each state in year t − 1. The predicted values from these regressions give us predicted values in year t. We use the values for year t + 1 to obtainĈINC Hi,t+1 andĈINC Lo, t+1 .
37 Naturally, values close to 0 then indicate that the dyadic distribution of material capabilities could be expected to remain more or less constant from year t to year t + 1.
38 Taken from the data in Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter (2008) , who expanded the data from Fortna (2003) the relationship between the predicted number of violent militarized interstate disputes and parity on the one hand, or rapid shifts in power on the other, is essentially flat.
43 A Pearson χ 2 goodness-of-fit test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the data are Poisson distributed in the specification shown in Table 1 . A negative binomial model shows no overdispersion in the data. 44 The coefficient estimates on Parity d,t and Future Decline d,t are positive, indicating that, in the absence of subsidies, these factors are positively associated with conflict, which is also expected. However, these effects are not distinguishable from zero, in contrast to the expectations of Proposition 1 and 2 and Corollary 3. We hesitate to read too much into this, however, given the small number of observations and the large number of studies that have reported the expected patterns regarding parity and shifts in power.
45 As recommended by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) . 46 That is, in both graphs, Violent MIDs d,t−1 is set equal to 0 and PKO d,t is set equal to 2. In Figure  1 [ Table 2 About Here]
The first thing to note is that our results suggest that, prior to the Yom Kippur war, the US did not condition the amount of aid it gave to Israel and Egypt on expectations of conflict. This is evident from the coefficient estimate on Expected MIDs d,t , which tells us the effect of this variable when Post Yom Kippur t is equal to 0 due to the multiplicative interaction. While this coefficient estimate is negative, seeming to imply that the expectation of conflict discouraged aid, it is statistically indistinguishable from 0. In contrast, after the Yom Kippur War, not only did the US provide more aid even in the absence of expectations of conflict, 49 but, more importantly, the amount of aid provided by the US increased when observable indicators (such as parity and shifts in power) pointed towards a greater expectation of conflict. Figure 3 illustrates this.
[ Figure 3 About Here]
Here, we plot the predicted level of economic assistance as a function of Expected MIDs d,t , both before the Yom Kippur War (in red) and after (in blue). We can see here that even when observable indicators point to a very low risk of hostility, the amount of aid our analysis leads us to expect the US to give is greater in the years following the Yom Kippur War than before. But in such cases, this difference is relatively modest. As the number of MIDs that would be expected to occur absent subsidies increases, however, the two lines begin to diverge sharply. This is because, as expected, the US has tended to respond to an elevated risk of conflict by providing more aid since the Yom Kippur War, but did not do so prior to that.
This suggests that at least part of what has driven US provision of economic assistance to
Israel and Egypt since the Yom Kippur War has been the expectation that doing so would prevent conflicts that would otherwise have occurred.
Further Examples
We now turn to a brief discussion of other examples of third parties providing tangible economic benefits to former/potential belligerents in ways that we think may have reduced the prospects for armed conflict.
In 1974, Cyprus experienced a coup that brought to power a government seeking unification with Greece. Turkish forces invaded Cyprus shortly thereafter. By war's end, the island was divided into a Turkish north and Greek south. The de facto partition is not considered a definitive resolution by any of the parties, and the conflict remains unresolved to this day. These patterns can be seen clearly in Figure 4 .
[ Figure 4 About Here]
While we cannot say for sure that the US was seeking to provide conditional subsidies in order to prevent renewed hostilities, the timing of the simultaneous and dramatic increases in bilateral trade with these two states is quite striking. We are not aware of any plausible alternative explanation for this pattern. Moreover, since these increases occurred under the same administration that initiated the US policy of buying peace between Israel and Egypt through the provision of conditional subsidies, it is not difficult to imagine that a similar strategy may have been at work here.
Recent work similarly indicates that third parties can prevent civil conflict by providing subsidies. Savun and Tirone (2011) demonstrate that democratizing states receiving higher levels of aid are less likely to experience conflict than those that receive less aid. The authors explain this finding by claiming that democracy aid resolves commitment problems. Our argument suggests a different interpretation: democracy aid may simply prevent conflict by raising the opportunity cost of war. We need not believe that the underlying commitment problems are resolved in order to explain the pattern identified by the authors.
Finally, talks between Serbia and Kosovo have recently broken down, and this is seen as a major blow to Serbia's EU bid. 52 Though the EU has failed, at least for now, to bring about agreement between these former disputants by linking their behavior to tangible economic benefits, this further indicates that attempts by third parties to buy peace come in a variety of forms from a variety of actors.
Conclusion
Recent literature on conflict management suggests a tension between the ability of third parties to bring peace in the short run relative to the long run. While the overall logic of this argument is persuasive, we believe there are important exceptions that have not been adequately explored previously. While it may be true on average that conflict management only delays the inevitable, this need not be the case.
Our bargaining model suggests that there are two conditions under which third parties may bring lasting peace without directly resolving the information or commitment problems that threaten to cause conflict. First, by their very nature, commitment problems due to rapid shifts in power disappear after said shift in power takes place. If a third party can provide sufficient subsidies, even temporarily, it may discourage inefficient fighting in the short term without promoting conflict in the long term.
Second, sometimes third parties have sufficiently large and/or stable interests to provide subsidies indefinitely. In so doing, they may indefinitely delay conflict. This may not be as desirable as resolving the underlying problem, but it can nonetheless be quite effective. suggesting that the best account for the reduction in conflict between these two states is external subsidies provided by the US in the form of foreign aid. Moreover, our results suggest that Israeli-Egyptian relations have been stabilized, but a return to conflict at some point in the future is not unforeseeable. Provided the United States remains committed to providing foreign aid to these two nations, the specter of war may remain forever on the edge of the horizon. But should the US cease to provide aid, as some members of Congress advocate, the peaceful relations between Israel and Egypt may be put at risk.
To further demonstrate the relevance of our argument, we briefly discussed other examples of third party attempts to link peace to tangible economic benefits, focusing on Turkish and
Greek relations with the US following the Turco-Cypriot War, the impact of democracy aid on the risk of civil conflict, and the EU's decision to make Serbian accession conditional on normalized relations with Kosovo. Though we did not discuss any of these examples in great detail due to limitations of space, we believe they illustrate that our argument applies to cases other than the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that conditional subsidies can come in the form of foreign aid, increased trade, or admittance to international organizations.
Though such arguments lie beyond the scope of this analysis, we wish to acknowledge that the strategy of purchasing peace through foreign aid has some unfortunate consequences.
Specifically, one might argue that, much as recipients of US foreign aid appear to have an incentive to have a terrorism problem (Bapat 2007 ), Israel and/or Egypt may have an incentive to make sure that fear of a return to past levels of violence never quite disappears.
Moreover, US foreign aid may have allowed Mubarak to remain in office, and to refrain from undertaking democratic reform. We therefore do not wish our claim to have demonstrated a link between US foreign aid and a reduced likelihood of conflict between Israel and Egypt to be taken as an endorsement of this policy.
Our primary goal has been to demonstrate that conflict management can be more effective than recent arguments indicate. Even though it may often be implausible for third parties to practice genuine conflict resolution, that need not mean that they are incapable of facilitating lasting peace-provided that they are willing to pay what may be a rather considerable price. To be sure, third parties often will not be willing to make extended commitments to continuously subsidizing peace. But sometimes they will be. We believe that the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict supports our theoretical arguments. Note: Graph based on the OLS regression shown in Before turning to the proofs, we first establish some important preliminary results.
Let V tA (·, h t ) and V tB (·, h t ) denote the continuation values, defined recursively, for A and B given some outcome and some history of play. For example, V tA (x t , h t ) would denote A's continuation value given history h t , and given that, in period t, B accepts A's proposal x t .
While many aspects of h t have no impact on the player's payoffs, the outcomes of previous battles play an important role, as we will discuss more below.
Further, let δ ∈ (0, 1) be a common discount factor.
For example, if in all future periods, A neither attacks B nor proposes terms any B would reject, V tA (x, h t ) = x t +σ tA +δV t+1A (x, h t+1 ) and V tB (x, h t ) = 1−x t +σ tB +δV t+1B (x, h t+1 ).
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Let V tA (w, h t ) and V tB (w, h t ) denote the continuation values for A and B, respectively, following a battle in period t that is won by A. Similarly, let V tA (l, h t ) and V tB (l, h t ) denote their continuation values following battles that A loses, i.e., those won by B.
For example, should A choose to attack B immediately in period t but offer proposals that B will accept regardless of type in all subsequent periods regardless of the outcome of the
where h w t+1 denotes the history of play as of period t + 1 given that A won a battle in period t and h l t+1 denotes the history in t + 1 given that A lost a battle in t.
We assume
The substantive interpretation of these assumptions is that, at any time, for either type of B, players profit from winning battles and suffer when losing them, regardless of whether they continue fighting or subsequently reach a negotiated agreement. Moreover, the extent to which the victor profits is identical to the magnitude of the defeated state's loss. Note, these assumptions are not necessary for any our key results. However, they greatly simplify our derivations.
Next, we establish a generic acceptance rule for B. In any given period t, B accepts A's
which simplifies to
For notational convenience, let
, and
where
Similarly, it will be useful later to define
Note that x t and x t are identical, save that one includes p tN and one p tN . Since p tN < p tN , it follows that x t < x t , provided q t − q t > δ V tB (w, h t ) − V tB (l, h t ) . This inequality must hold, as the right hand side is strictly negative by assumption.
To ensure interior solutions, we assume throughout that 0 < x t < x t < 1. Otherwise, A's optimal strategy in equilibrium may involve extreme proposals, those allocating all of the good to either A or B.
We can now state B's acceptance rule more succinctly. The relatively weak type accepts iff x t ≤ x t and the strong type accepts iff x t ≤ x t , where
and thus x t < x t , ensures that any proposal that would be accepted by the relatively strong type will also be accepted by the relatively weak type.
Thus, while A does not know the value of m tB , since A knows that m tB = m tB with probability ω, m tB = m tB with probability 1 − ω, and x t < x t , A can infer the following:
and u A (x t ≤ x t ) is simply
To simplify the analysis, we focus on cases where war is inefficient and thus A has no incentive to select any value of x t save x t or x t . This requires an additional restriction that primarily concerns the continuation values, which we identify below.
Note that setting x t = x t is always strictly preferred to x t < x t , since u A (x t ≤ x t ) = x t + σ tA + δ V tA (x, h t ) and this expression must be smaller when x t < x t than when x t = x t .
Intuitively, if A is unwilling to risk war, it is still best to at least extract the best possible deal to which the strong type of B would agree.
Similarly, setting x t = x t is strictly preferred to x t < x t < x t , since A provokes war with the strong type of B either way and receives worse agreements from the weak type of B when setting x t < x t < x t relative to x t = x t . Thus, if A is to risk war, A might as well seek to extract the best possible deal from the weak type of B.
Now consider whether A prefers x t = x t to x t > x t . Since A provokes a war with the strong B either way, this is equivalent to asking whether A prefers to have the weak B accept x t rather than also fighting a war against a weak B, which is true if and only if war is inefficient. This holds so long as
Provided Inequality 1 holds, war is inefficient, and A will only ever select x t or x t . Since, as discussed above, we have already assumed that the benefit to the victor of a battle is equal to the loss suffered by the loser, or
right hand side of Inequality 1 goes to 0, and the inequality must hold. Had we not made this assumption, there would still be cases in which war is inefficient.
What remains then is to determine how A decides between these to proposals.
A prefers x t = x t , which guarantees acceptance, to x t = x t , which risks war, provided
This simplifies to ω ≤ω tx , whereω tx is defined as
Note that, to preserve space, we use V k ti to denote V ti (k, h t ) ∀ i ∈ {A, B}, k ∈ {x, w, l}.
We shall continue to do so from this point forward.
Provided both the numerator and denominator are positive, we can be sure thatω tx is strictly bounded between 0 and 1, since the denominator is identical to the numerator but for two differences. First, the denominator includes (p tN −p tN )(q t −q t ), which is strictly positive. is multiplied by p tN in the denominator and by p tN in the numerator. Since B's continuation value after A loses battles is greater than after A wins battles, this difference also serves to increase the denominator relative to the numerator.
We can thus succinctly characterize A's optimal proposal in any given period, x * t , as
Now consider A's decision over whether to attack immediately or to negotiate. First, suppose ω ≤ω tx , indicating that A will propose x t , which B accepts regardless of type, should A attempt negotiations at all. When ω ≤ω tx , A prefers negotiation to attacking immediately provided . Now suppose ω >ω tx , indicating that, should A negotiate rather than attacking B immediately, A will propose x t , a proposal that B accepts iff relatively weak. Then A prefers negotiation to attacking immediately provided (1 − ω) p tN q t − c + δ V tA (w, h t ) + (1 − p tN ) q t − c + δ V tA (l, h t ) + ω x t + σ tA + δ V tA (x, h t ) ≥ ω p tI (q t − c + δV . With these elements in place, we are now prepared to discuss the propositions laid out in the text, all of which concern the likelihood of war. Proposition 3. The proof of this proposition follows readily from the previous two proofs.
Letσ t be the minimum value of σ t that ensures that ω ≤ min{ω tx ,ω tm } holds. The precise value depends upon which of the two cutpoints is lower, but is identified readily in either case by solving ω ≤ω tx or ω ≤ω tm for σ t .
Letι t be the minimum value for which ι t −σ t ≥ 0 holds. Of course, then,ι t =σ t .
The beliefs follow readily from Bayes' Rule, and incentive compatibility for each players' strategies follows from the preceding results.
Now suppose that had C set σ t = 0, we would have ω > max{ω tx ,ω tb }. Then if ι t ≥ι t , but ι t+1 <ι t+1 , C will set σ t =σ t in period t but σ t+1 = 0 in the following period, and we would conclude that C's subsidies in period t merely shifted the risk of war due to informational problems into the future, as per the equilibrium.
All else equal, it is more likely to be true that ι t ≥ι t while ι t+1 <ι t+1 as E( tι ) increases.
We therefore conclude that C is more likely to shift the risk of war due to information problems into the future as C's interests become less stable.
Proposition 5. Take the same beliefs and strategies as in the previous proposition. Now suppose that were C to set σ t = 0, we would have eitherω tm < ω ≤ω tx or ω tx < ω <ω tb , but if C sets σ t+1 = 0, we will have ω ≤ min{ω tx ,ω tm }. This requires α t+1 to be arbitrarily small relative to α t , or that the bulk of the shift in power occurs in t.
Here, even if ι t ≥ι t , but ι t+1 <ι t+1 , in which case C will set σ t =σ t in period t but σ t+1 = 0 in the following period, peace obtains in both periods in equilibrium. We therefore conclude that even temporary subsidies ensure lasting peace, as per the proposition.
Proposition 6. Consider once more the same beliefs and strategies as above.
Suppose that were C to set σ t = 0 in any given t, we would have ω > max{ω tx ,ω tb } and thus there would be a risk of war due to informational problems.
Provided either that ι t through ι t+k are sufficiently large or E( t+1ι ) through E( t+kι ) are sufficiently small, for some k ∈ [1, ∞), C will set σ t =σ t in periods t through t + k, and peace is expected to obtain in equilibrium for at least k periods even though there would be a risk of war due to information problems otherwise. This establishes the result.
